

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 2513

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THERE FOLLOWS BELOW THE TEXT OF J DE G (77) 40, THE INTER-
NATIONAL STAFF DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF MINISTERIAL
GUIDANCE 1977. DEFENSE REVIEW COMMITTEE WILL INFORMALLY
DISCUSS THIS DRAFT ON APRIL 29. BEGIN TEXT:

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE - 1977

DRAFT UNCLASSIFIED VERSION

1. THE AGREED PROCEDURES FOR DEFENSE PLANNING IN NATO
CALL FOR MINISTERS TO GIVE GUIDANCE EVERY TWO YEARS FOR
THE FORCE PROPOSALS TO BE PREPARED BY THE MAJOR NATO COM-
MANDERS AND FOR THE SUBSEQUENT STEPS LEADING TO THE ADOPT-
TION OF FORCE GOALS. THE GUIDANCE REFLECTS THE POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS WHICH COULD
AFFECT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO FORCES DURING THE PLANNING
PERIOD UP TO 1984, AND THE IMPACT OF THESE FACTORS ON NATO
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STRATEGY. THE GUIDANCE, BEING A MAJOR POLICY DOCUMENT
ENDORSED BY MINISTERS, PROVIDES A DIRECTIVE FOR ALL
DEFENSE PLANNING ACTIVITIES INCLUDING SUPPORTING PROGRAMS,
BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IN NATO.

NATO OBJECTIVES

2. THE OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO IS TO PRESERVE
PEACE AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY AREA PRIMARILY BY A CREDIBLE DETERRENCE

EFFECTED BY CONFRONTING ANY POSSIBLE THREATENED OR ACTUAL AGGRESSION, RANGING FROM COVERT OPERATIONS TO GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR, WITH ADEQUATE NATO FORCES. SHOULD AGGRESSION OCCUR, THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES ARE TO PRESERVE AND RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE NATO AREA BY EMPLOYING SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENSE AND FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE.

3. IN PURSUIT OF ITS OBJECTIVES OF DETERRENCE, DEFENSE AND DETENTE, THE ALLIANCE IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST ON CERTAIN BROAD ISSUES OF SECURITY. HOWEVER, ANY EVENTUAL CHANGE IN TERMS OF MILITARY SECURITY STILL REMAINS TO BE IDENTIFIED.

THE LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT

4. THE 1975 MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF WHICH REMAIN SUBSTANTIALLY VALID, INCORPORATED A LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT. THE ESSENCE OF THIS CONCEPT IS THAT NATO CAN ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IF NATIONS WORK TOGETHER MORE EFFICIENTLY, IF THE ALLIES CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE LEVELS OF DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS AND IF NATO AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES SET AND APPLY RIGOROUS PRIORITIES. A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE CONCEPT, LOOKING TO THE LONGER TERM, IS TO ESTABLISH A MORE COMPREHENSIVE

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FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE PLANNING.

5. THE 1977 GUIDANCE EMPHASIZES THAT THE LONG-RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED MORE VIGOROUSLY IN THE COMING PLANNING PERIOD; IN SO DOING IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ADVERSE TRENDS IN THE MILITARY BALANCE WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN RECENT YEARS.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

6. THE STEADY EXPANSION OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY CAPABILITIES HAS FUNDAMENTALLY TRANSFORMED THE CHARACTER AND FLEXIBILITY OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. THESE FORCES ARE INCREASINGLY OFFENSIVE IN POSTURE AND NOW CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE SOVIET UNION'S POLITICAL INTERESTS ON A GLOBAL SCALE.

7. THE STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUE TO IMPROVE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF NEW NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS, INCLUDING THE EXPECTED DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 MOBILE INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEM CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AND BEYOND AND NEW SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. IT IS IN THE CONVENTIONAL

FIELD, HOWEVER, WHERE THE GROWTH OF THE WARSAW PACT CAPABILITY HAS BEEN MOST PRONOUNCED. IN PARTICULAR, THE WARSAW PACT HAS THE CAPABILITY TO STAGE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN EUROPE WITHOUT REINFORCEMENT, USING INITIALLY FORCES WHICH ARE IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS AND DEPLOYED CLOSE

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TO NATO BORDERS; AND TO EXPLOIT ANY INITIAL SUCCESS WITH ADDITIONAL READY FORCES. THE IMPROVED CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT TACTICAL AIR FORCES, AND THE INCREASING AMOUNT OF THOSE FORCES WHICH COULD BE USED FOR OFFENSIVE AND DEEP PENETRATION OPERATIONS, NOW PERMIT THE WARSAW PACT TO CONDUCT THE INITIAL STAGES OF AN AIR ATTACK TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN HITHERTO WITH IN-PLACE FORCES. THE SOVIET UNION CAN NOW EXERCISE SEA POWER ON A GLOBAL SCALE. THIS FOLLOWS THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW AND IMPROVED SHIPS, SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT; MARKED IMPROVEMENTS IN WEAPONS AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, OPERATING STANDARDS AND LOGISTIC POSTURE; AND ACCESS TO OVERSEAS SHORE SUPPORT FACILITIES AND AIRFIELDS.

8. THE STEADY GROWTH IN MILITARY POWER IS BACKED IN THE SOVIET UNION BY AN ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN 11 TO 13 OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND BY AN ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURE OF ABOUT 5. THE HEAVY INVESTMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION IN MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT HAS BEGUN TO ERODE THE QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGE IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT LONG ENJOYED BY NATO.

9. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIES ARE UNDERTAKING SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT
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MENT REPLACEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES REMAIN IN NATO FORCES. THE FORCE GOALS AND COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM ADOPTED IN THE LIGHT OF THE

1975 GUIDANCE REPRESENTED MINIMUM OBJECTIVES TO MAINTAIN NATO'S DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN THE LIGHT OF THE THREAT AS ASSESSED AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, MANY OF THESE OBJECTIVES WERE NOT BEING ACHIEVED BY COUNTRIES.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

10. AS A RESULT OF THE CONTINUING GROWTH IN THE WARSAW PACT'S OFFENSIVE MILITARY POWER AND OF THE INADEQUACY OF THE NATO RESPONSE, THE DISPARITY IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT CONTINUES TO WIDEN. THIS ADVERSE TREND POINTS TO CERTAIN AREAS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN BOTH NATIONAL AND NATO PLANNING.

11. NATO STRATEGY. NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR DETERRENCE AND FORWARD DEFENSE CALLS FOR A FLEXIBLE AND BALANCED RANGE OF APPROPRIATE RESPONSES, CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR, TO ALL LEVELS OF AGGRESSION OR THREATS OF AGGRESSION. THIS CONCEPT REMAINS VALID. HOWEVER, IF NATO IS TO RETAIN THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THIS STRATEGY AND TO AVOID LOWERING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, A BALANCED FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM DIRECTED TOWARDS CORRECTING CRITICAL DEFICIENCIES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH EMPHASIS PLACED ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS.

12. WARNING OF WAR. FULL ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN OF THE COMPRESSION OF WARNING TIMES RESULTING FROM KNOWN IMPROVEMENTS IN THE WARSAW PACT FORCES, PARTICULARLY CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHICH HAVE GIVEN THEM AN INCREASED ABILITY TO ATTACK WITH MINIMUM PREPARATION. WHILE NATO SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE WARSAW PACT AGGRESSIONS, FROM AN ATTACK BY READY FORCES
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WITH MINIMUM WARNING TO A FULLY REINFORCED ATTACK WITH A PERIOD OF TENSION AS SHORT AS A FEW WEEKS, PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO THE WARSAW PACT'S IMPROVED CAPABILITY TO ATTACK WITH MINIMUM WARNING.

13. CRISIS MANAGEMENT. FOR DETERRENCE AS WELL AS DEFENSE, NATO NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO TAKE PROMPT POLITICAL DECISIONS IN TIMES OF TENSION, AS WELL AS TO DEPLOY ITS FORCES IN A TIMELY AND ORDERLY FASHION READY FOR WAR. THIS REQUIRES HIGHLY DEVELOPED SYSTEMS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT INCLUDING COMMAND AND CONTROL AND FOR THE DIRECTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND IMPROVED CO-ORDINATION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN ORDER TO EXERCISE THE MAXIMUM CONTROL IN A DEVELOPING CRISIS.

14. READY FORCES. THE ENHANCED ABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AT SHORT NOTICE PLACES ADDITIONAL

EMPHASIS ON NATO'S NEED FOR ADEQUATE, FULLY TRAINED AND EXERCISED IN-PLACE FORCES.

15. RESERVE FORCES. ASSIGNED AND EARMARKED RESERVE FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF BEING DEPLOYED RAPIDLY AS ORGANIZED, EQUIPPED AND SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED UNITS IN SUPPORT OF THE STANDING FORCES. SYSTEMS FOR RAPID CALL-UP SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND EXERCISED SO THAT THE MANPOWER NEEDED TO MAKE STANDING FORCES COMBAT READY CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE ON TIME.

16. REINFORCEMENTS. NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT REQUIRES

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A CAPABILITY FOR RAPID AUGMENTATION OF ITS IN-PLACE FORCES. REINFORCEMENT AND AUGMENTATION FORCES SHOULD REACH AN AREA OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT BEFORE AN AGGRESSION TAKES PLACE OR, IF WARNING TIME IS VERY SHORT, EARLY ENOUGH TO AFFECT THE INITIAL COURSE OF HOSTILITIES. SPECIAL EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON PRESTOCKING, ON THE TIMELY PROVISION OF SEA AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND ON ADEQUATE RECEPTION FACILITIES.

17. DEFENSE AGAINST ARMOR. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIANCE HAS IMPROVED ITS ANTI-ARMOR CAPABILITIES, A WIDE GAP PERSISTS BETWEEN THESE CAPABILITIES AND THE THREAT POSED BY THE WARSAW PACT'S ARMORED FORCES. MODERN ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS ALREADY IN INVENTORIES GO SOME WAY TOWARDS MEETING THIS THREAT, BUT IN SOME NATIONS CURRENT HOLDINGS AND ACQUISITION PLANS FALL SHORT OF THE REQUIREMENT.

18. MARITIME. THE UNREMITTING BUILD-UP AND MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET NAVY, PERMITTING THE SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE SEA POWER ON A GLOBAL SCALE, CALL FOR A REVIEW OF NATO'S ABILITY TO COPE WITH THE LONG-TERM EMERGING SITUATION AND TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE SOVIET PRESSURE AT SEA IN PEACETIME OR IN A PERIOD OF TENSION, AS WELL AS TO DEAL WITH AGGRESSION AT SEA, IN PARTICULAR ON THE SEA LANES WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE TIMELY REINFORCEMENT AND RE-

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SUPPLY OF EUROPE. THE MARITIME CONTRIBUTION TO THE OVER-ALL NATO STRATEGY CONTINUES TO BE A BASIC ELEMENT IN MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE DETERRENT.

19. AIR DEFENSE. THE INCREASING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO IMPROVE NATO'S AIR DEFENSES OVER LAND AND AT SEA. TO ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY OF NATO FORCES, THE ALLIANCE'S INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED AND MODERNIZED.

20. REGIONAL ASPECTS. THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA IS INDIVISIBLE. ON THE FLANKS AN ADEQUATE ALLOCATION OF FORCES AND A BALANCED MILITARY EFFORT MUST BE ASSURED; CONTINUED EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO STRENGTHEN LOCAL MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES, ADVANCE THE ARRIVAL TIMES OF EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENTS AND IMPROVE RECEPTION AND OTHER LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS.

21. NEW TECHNOLOGY. MODERN TECHNOLOGY CAN OFFER OPPORTUNITIES WHICH, IF UTILIZED IN A TIMELY AND INTEGRATED MANNER, CAN BESTOW SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS ON THE DETERRENT AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF NATO.
ALLIANCE CO-OPERATION

22. THE 1975 GUIDANCE RECOGNISED THAT NATO RESOURCES WERE NOT BEING EMPLOYED IN AN OPTIMUM MANNER SINCE DEFENCE PROGRAMMES ARE ORGANIZED FOR THE MOST PART ON A NATIONAL BASIS, AND THAT THE PREROGATIVES OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF FINANCE WERE BOUND TO PLACE LIMITS ON THE PACE AND DEGREE TO WHICH INTEGRATION COULD BE ACHIEVED. A MEASURE OF PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BUT THERE IS MUCH ROOM FOR A BETTER ALLOCATION OF DEFENCE RESOURCES, ESPECIALLY THROUGH GREATER ALLIANCE CO-OPERATION. THIS PROCESS WOULD BE GREATLY FACILITATED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENCE PLANNING INCORPORATING A LONGER TERM APPROACH. ONLY THUS WOULD IT
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BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH IN A TIMELY AND ORDERLY WAY THE NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS, SET THE PRIORITIES, RECONCILE DEMANDS ON RESOURCES FOR CO-OPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH THOSE REQUIRED FOR NATIONAL EFFORTS, AND IDENTIFY AREAS FOR CO-OPERATION

ARMAMENTS PLANNING

23. THE TREND FOR THE COST OF EQUIPMENT TO INCREASE DISPROPORTIONATELY IN RELATION TO MOST OTHER DEFENCE COSTS

HAS CONTINUED. IN MANY CASES THE COST OF MAJOR DEFENCE PROJECTS IS BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF MOST MEMBER NATIONS TO FINANCE ALONE. UNCO-ORDINATED RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENT WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR SIMILAR ROLES HAS LED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO LEAD, TO PROBLEMS OF NON-STANDARDIZATION AND THE LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN FORCES AND EQUIPMENT OF MEMBER NATIONS.

24. ONGOING STUDIES SHOULD THEREFORE BE PURSUED WITH A VIEW TO HARMONISING NATIONAL DEFENCE EQUIPMENT PLANNING PROCEDURES AND DEVELOPING NATO LONG-TERM ARMAMENTS PLANNING. LONG-TERM PLANNING TARGETS SHOULD BE BASED ON COMMON THREAT CRITERIA AND AGREED OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS, PHILOSOPHIES AND DOCTRINES. THERE SHOULD BE EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS AND PROJECTS WHICH COMMEND THEMSELVES TO A MULTINATIONAL APPROACH UNDER THE AEGIS OF NATO. THE AIM OF THESE EFFORTS SHOULD BE STANDARDIZATION AND, WHERE THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, FULL INTEROPERABILITY.
25. IN PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO

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SAFEGUARD ESSENTIAL NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL BASES, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE ADVANCED NATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL ABILITIES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSURING ACCESS TO MULTIPLE SOURCES OF PROCUREMENT. AN INCREASE IN TRAFFIC IN THE "TWO-WAY STREET" BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA IN WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THIS CONTEXT.

IMPACT ON NATO PLANNING

26. IN DEVELOPING MORE RATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR NATO'S LONG-TERM PLANNING FOR DEFENCE, NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, MUST SEEK TO HARMONISE PLANNING MECHANISMS FOR THE VARIOUS CO-OPERATIVE AND SUPPORTING PROGRAMMES, AND TO DOVETAIL THE RESULTS OF THIS EFFORT WITH THE PRESENT NATO FORCE PLANNING PROCEDURES INTO A COMPREHENSIVE

APPROACH FOR ALLIANCE DEFENCE PLANNING; THE NEED FOR EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF MAJOR CO-OPERATIVE PROJECTS WILL BE OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. THE ACTIVITIES OF REGIONAL GROUPS, SUCH AS THE EUROGROUP, WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE IN THIS CONTEXT.

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CONCLUSION

27. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES FOR ALLIANCE CO-OPERATION DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION IS ESSENTIAL IF THE FULL POTENTIAL OF AVAILABLE DEFENCE RESOURCES IS TO BE REALISED.

RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE

28. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ADVERSE TRENDS IN THE NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE AND IN ORDER TO AVOID A CONTINUED DETERIORATION IN THE RELATIVE FORCE CAPABILITIES, AN ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENCE BUDGETS SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES. NATIONS SHOULD, MOREOVER, ENDEAVOUR TO INCREASE THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR DEFENCE EXPENDITURES, IN PARTICULAR THE PERCENTAGE OF SUCH EXPENDITURE DEVOTED TO MAJOR EQUIPMENT, BUT WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO COMBAT READINESS.

GUIDANCE

29. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, MINISTERS ESTABLISHED SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORCE PROPOSALS, AND FOR NATIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING AND FOR THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE IN PERMANENT SESSION FOR MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDANCE THROUGHOUT THE VARIOUS PHASES OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING. END TEXT.
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